Call for papers

Current call for papers

 

“Illiberal Populism” Shaped by Political and Administrative Institutions:

Reciprocal Dynamics and Counter-Power Logics

 

The election of heads of state or governments described as “populist” or “illiberal” has given rise to research into the developments they trigger or accelerate: the redefinition of the balance of powers, the restriction and repression of opposition movements, the questioning of minority rights, the marginalization of media outlets critical of their actions, among others. The administrations of Trump in the United States, Bolsonaro in Brazil, Orbán in Hungary, and Modi in India have renewed debates on regime classification and on the boundaries between democratic and authoritarian political systems (Levitsky and Ziblatt, 2018; Bonnard, Dakowska, Gobille, 2021). Yet the inverse relationship, namely the effect of institutions on political actors and forces that reject the principles and procedures of liberal democracies, has been much less examined. However, while populist actors seek to redefine the political system, their insertion into the political field compels them to negotiate and renegotiate a series of legal rules and behavioral norms that are binding upon them, at least initially. In this sense, they are sometimes constrained in their attempt to reshape the political and legal system by other state powers or institutions, which more or less temporarily curtail their capacity for action.

From a legal perspective, this issue will be addressed by focusing specifically on counter-powers, their definition, and their actions. In law, state power is entrusted to distinct bodies, each holding a share of authority: executive, legislative, and judicial. It would therefore seem inaccurate to refer to them as counter-powers. Yet this understanding is gaining ground, particularly in contexts where executives seek to reestablish a unified concentration of power to their own benefit. One may thus ask whether abuses of power reveal the counter-power status of certain institutions, for instance when parliaments or judges react to executive abuses. Here again, illiberalism may appear as a source of transformation in the status of institutions, which evolve according to a logic of reciprocal effects.

This issue is addressed to both political scientists and legal scholars and adopts a comparative perspective. It invites a reconsideration of the theme of illiberal developments in political regimes through the lens of the reciprocal relationship between populist forces and politico-administrative institutions. It aims to examine the process through which these forces take hold of and are themselves shaped by these institutions, understood either as sets of legal rules or, from a sociological perspective, as social structures stabilized over time (Dulong, 2012; Lacroix and Lagroye, 1992). Conversely, it also focuses on the illiberal transformations of institutions or on their resistance to abusive power (Perlo and Duffy-Meunier, 2025). In doing so, it seeks to extend reflections on the mutations of institutions and institutional roles generated by the entry of “new” actors into the political arena, an analysis that has been conducted more extensively with regard to elected officials and socialist forces across the world (Lefebvre, 2004; Rocha, 2008), and more sporadically, with respect to the far right (Collovald, 1989; Saundaj, 2025).

Proposals may fall within one of the following three axes:

1. Mastery of the Institutional Game and Transformations of the Political System

The first section seeks to analyze the transformations generated by populist actors in light of their trajectories and those of their close collaborators. Although many representatives of populism or illiberalism present themselves as outsiders, they are rarely newcomers to the political field; several have previously held positions in party leadership, exercised elected mandates, or occupied advisory roles to elected officials, during which they became socialized into the institutional logics of the field. The aim is thus to examine the relationship between these trajectories and the ways in which they perform the role of head of state or government. Are institutions invested in the same way when these actors have been socialized into the political game within a party organization or through the exercise of one or more mandates, as opposed to those whose symbolic capital has been accumulated in other social fields? Does their unequal mastery of institutional norms and their implicit rules inform their practice of power? Depending on the configuration of the political fields under study, particularly the degree of autonomy of political institutions vis-à-vis socio-economic fields, do heads of state and government possess the same capacity to redefine relations between powers and the taken-for-granted norms of institutions?

2. Institutional Resistance and Counter-Powers

The second section focuses on the mechanisms of collective action and the strategies employed by institutions and actors targeted by the criticisms and interventions of populist authorities to preserve their influence or to contest the limitations imposed upon them. It therefore invites an examination of the effectiveness of institutions and counter-powers in preventing the abuse or concentration of public authority. When authoritarian policies fail, is this failure attributable to the action of such counter-powers and if so, which ones? Under what conditions are judicial bodies able or unable to maintain a degree of institutional autonomy? More broadly, beyond the core state institutions, this perspective allows for the study of other public entities: independent administrative authorities, local government bodies, universities, and regulatory agencies.

Beyond formal public bodies, what counter-powers operate within society and how do they respond to illiberal policies? In particular, one may examine whether the press is still able to perform this role while its independence is challenged by the state itself. This includes norms that restrict freedom of expression, those that deregulate it, such as the repeal of the Fairness Doctrine under Reagan, and rules that limit journalists’ legal protections or compromise financial independence. If the press’s capacity for resistance declines, is it offset by the emergence of social media? Does their mobilizing power constitute a safeguard against abuse of authority or does it risk becoming a tool in the hands of those in power?

3. Temporalities and Evolution of the Political System and Institutions

This section seeks to anchor the analysis of illiberal transformations in an examination of the temporalities of power exercise (Marrel and Payre, 2018). Does the weakening of democratic systems depend on the number of terms served and consequently on the length of time spent at the apex of the state? Are substantial transformations observable in the short term and if so, of what nature? How should one conceptualize the relationship between anti-democratic discourse and changes in institutional relations? Finally, are illiberal transformations challenged by political alternation, when populist heads of state or government do not remain in power?

From the perspective of institutions understood in legal terms, the question of their transformation to respond to violations or threats also constitutes an important analytical angle. If a threat has been overcome or averted, one may ask whether the law has incorporated the necessary adjustments: amendments to constitutions to provide new procedures preventing the realization of such threats, new legislative frameworks governing political activity, in particular that of political parties. One example is Germany, where, faced with the difficulty of enforcing rules allowing the Constitutional Court to ban a party, new legislation was enacted to limit public funding for parties seeking to overthrow the constitutional order. Similarly, responses to the risk of national or even constitutional law being shaped by abusive ideologies may, as in Belgium or Luxembourg, take the form of affirming the role of European or international norms in protecting the rule of law.

Finally, it is important to examine the capacity of the rule of law to reassert itself after a period of illiberalism without being compromised, for instance in cases of purges of judges appointed by illiberal authorities, which would undermine judicial independence, or in the restoration of media oversight and control.

References 

Barbé V., Combrade B.-L. et Sénac Ch.-É. (dir.). 2023. La démocratie illibérale en droit constitutionnel, Bruylant.

Benetti J., Hochmann T. et Molfessis (dir.). 2025. « Qui en veut à l’État de droit ? » Pouvoirs 193(2). Dossier thématique.

Bonnard, P., Dakowska, D. et Gobille, B. (dir.). 2021. Faire, défaire la démocratie : De Moscou, Bogota et Téhéran au Conseil de l’Europe. Paris : Karthala.

Davis F. T. 2025. « Donald Trump et la doctrine de l’ »exécutif unitaire » : quels sont les enjeux ? » Le club des juristes (7 mars 2025).

Derosier J. P. (dir.). 2026. « La préservation de la Constitution ». Les Cahiers du Forincip. Paris : Lexis/Nexis, à paraitre.

Dulong D. 2012. Sociologie des institutions politiques. Paris : La découverte, coll. Repères.

Enyedi, Z. 2016. « Paternalist populism and illiberal elitism in Central Europe ». Journal of Political Ideologies 21(1).

Ginsburg, T. 2019. « International Courts and Democratic Backsliding. » Ecology Law Quarterly, 46(1), 111–124.

https://doi.org/10.15779/Z38K35MD9M

Hostovsky Brandes, T. « International law in domestic courts in an era of populism », International Journal of Constitutional Law, Volume 17, Issue 2, April 2019, Pages 576–596,

https://doi.org/10.1093/icon/moz031

Hunter, W. & Power, Timothy J. 2019. « Bolsonaro and Brazil’s Illiberal Backlash. » Journal of Democracy 30(1): 68–82.

Jaffrelot, C. 2019. L’Inde de Modi : national-populisme et démocratie ethnique. Paris : Fayard.

Jaffrelot, C. 2021. Modi’s India: Hindu Nationalism and the Rise of Ethnic Democracy. Princeton : Princeton University Press.

Kovács, K. & Scheppele, K. L. 2018. « The fragility of an independent judiciary: Lessons from Hungary and Poland — and the European Union. » Communist and Post-Communist Studies, 51(3), 189–200.

https://doi.org/10.1016/j.postcomstud.2018.07.005

Lacroix B. et Lagroye J. (dir.). 1992. Le Président de la République. Usages et genèses d’une institution. Paris : Presses de la FNSP.

Lefebvre, R. 2004. « Le socialisme français soluble dans l’institution municipale ? Forme partisane et emprise institutionnelle : Roubaix (1892-1983) ». Revue française de science politique 54(2) : 237-260.

https://doi.org/10.3917/rfsp.542.0237.

Levitsky S., et Ziblatt Z. 2018. How democracies die, New York: Crown.

Marrel, G. et Payre, R. (dir.). 2018. Temporalité(s) politique(s) : Le temps dans l’action politique collective. Louvain-la-Neuve: De Boeck Supérieur.

https://doi.org/10.3917/dbu.deze.2018.01.

Monge P. 2015. « Les groupes minoritaires de l’article 51-1 de la Constitution : de l’artifice juridique à la réalité politique d’un contre-pouvoir », Revue française de droit constitutionnel 103(3).

Mounk Y., Davis F. T. 2025. « Quid Juris » Donald Trump : une menace pour la démocratie américaine ? Le club des juristes (31 janvier 2025).

Muhlmann G., 2006. « Le gros mot de contre-pouvoir ». Pouvoirs 119(4).

Nabli B. 2010. « L’opposition parlementaire : un contre-pouvoir politique saisi par le droit ». Pouvoirs. 133(2).

Perlo N. et Duffy-Meunier A. (dir.), 2025. La justice constitutionnelle illibérale. Revue internationale de droit comparé.  3, 77e année.

Rocha, D. de Castro, 2008. « Le Parti des Travailleurs à l’épreuve du pouvoir. Le PT dans le District Fédéral au Brésil (1980-2000) », Nuevo Mundo Mundos Nuevos [En ligne].

http://journals.openedition.org/nuevomundo/28152

https://doi.org/10.4000/nuevomundo.28152

Sauandaj, A. 2025. Socio-histoire de l’entreprise politique Bolsonaro (1989-2025). Masculinité stratégique et travail de représentation à l’ère du numérique. Thèse de doctorat en science politique, Université Paris 1.

Scheppele, K. L0 2018. « Autocratic legalism ». University of Chicago Law Review 85(2): 545–583.

Shim S., 2018. « Droit constitutionnel étranger. La séparation des pouvoirs au bord du précipice : le rôle du contre-pouvoir de la Cour constitutionnelle dans la procédure de destitution du Président en Corée du Sud », Revue française de droit constitutionnel 113(1).

Soma A. 2014. Le peuple comme contre-pouvoir en Afrique, Revue du Droit Public. 4.

Tusseau G. 2024. « L’inexécution des décisions des juridictions constitutionnelles : de la pathologie répréhensible à la prise de conscience salutaire ». In F. Barque. 2024. L’inexécution des décisions des juridictions constitutionnelles : Approches de droits étrangers et de droit comparé (p. 9-XIII). Société de législation comparée (2024).

***

 Deadlines :

  • Proposals will be evaluated by the Editorial Board which will give a first feedback.
  • Articles can be in English, in Spanish or in French.